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The more one studies the debate surrounding modes of 
Constitutional interpretation,1 the more dismaying the experience 
 
 *  Assistant Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law.  An early 
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Law, Culture, and the Humanities.  Thanks to Dean Hannah Arterian for her support in 
making this article possible.  Thanks to Raymond Kruger, Richard Decker, and Lucia Lin, 
who gave me invaluable help on some technical details.  Thanks also to my parents for 
surrounding me with music, and to the many  teachers who taught me about playing and 
conducting E♭ major sonata form movements, among other things, including Martin 
Rutherford, Roger Raphael, Alexander Goehr, Robert Page, Harold Farberman, and Istvan 
Jaray.  And thanks, as always, to Julia McKinstry. 
 1. Some believe that “interpretation” is the wrong word to use to describe the 
process of applying the Constitution.  Jaroslav Pelikan summarizes the issue in relation to 
biblical interpretation:  “For biblical exegesis, the technical term ‘to interpret’ in various 
languages (including English) can mean either ‘to translate’ or ‘to expound,’ also because 
translation necessarily involves interpretation.  For constitutional interpretation, too, the 
situation may sometimes be obscured by the technical vocabulary of legal hermeneutics.  
Rather than ‘to interpret,’ the technical term used in the language of the Supreme Court 
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becomes.  Lurking close to the surface of the coded discourse of 
Constitutional scholars is the aggressive tone and cultural dynamic of 
the playground. Reduced to its essence, the substance of the debate 
seems more akin to a Monty Python sketch2 than to the scholarly 
exchange of ideas one would hope for in this area.3 
 
during the Nineteenth Century (and even beyond) is often the grammatical term ‘to 
construe,’ for which the cognate noun is ‘construction.’ . . .”  JAROSLAV PELIKAN, 
INTERPRETING THE BIBLE AND THE CONSTITUTION 11-12 (2004).  I have taken my cue from 
Justice Scalia, who uses “interpretation” in the title of his book.  ANTONIN SCALIA,  A 
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997). 
 2. The example that comes readily to mind is Monty Python’s “Argument Sketch.”  
In the sketch, a man (“M”) comes to an office seeking an argument, and is directed to speak 
with Mr. Barnard (“B”).   A portion of their discussion gives a flavor for the entire sketch: 
M:  Oh look, this isn't an argument. 
B:  Yes it is. 
M:  No it isn't. It's just contradiction. 
B:  No it isn't. 
M:  It is! 
B:  It is not. 
M:  Look, you just contradicted me. 
B:  I did not. 
M:  Oh you did!! 
B:  No, no, no. 
M:  You did just then. 
B:  Nonsense! 
M:  Oh, this is futile! 
B:  No it isn't. 
MONTY PYTHON, MONTY PYTHON’S PREVIOUS RECORD (Charisma Records 1972),  transcript 
available at  http://www.mindspring.com/~mfpatton/sketch.htm (last visited Dec. 15, 2006). 
 3. Speaking about “nonoriginalist” opinions, Justice Scalia observed that, in the 
past, they “have almost always had the decency to lie, or at least to dissemble, about what 
they were doing – either ignoring strong evidence of original intent that contradicted the 
minimal recited evidence of an original intent congenial to the court’s desires, or else not 
discussing original intent at all, speaking in terms of broad constitutional generalities with 
no pretense of historical support.”  Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. 
CINN. L. REV. 849, 852 (1989).  Justice Scalia later dismissed the theoretical underpinnings 
of “nonoriginalism” by claiming that it is “incompatib[le] with the very principle that 
legitimizes judicial review of constitutionality.”  Id. at 854.  Justice Scalia is hardly less 
sympathetic to “originalism,” a theory which, he claims, is “also not without its warts,” id. 
at 856, whose adherents are “faint-hearted” and whose theory of interpretation is no 
different from the moderate nonoriginalist, “except that the former finds it comforting to 
make up (out of whole cloth) an original evolutionary intent, and the latter thinks that 
superfluous.”  Id. at 862.  Some years later, Justice Scalia’s views had hardened, describing 
what he now called “strict constructionism” as “a degraded form of textualism that brings 
the whole philosophy into disrepute.”  SCALIA, supra note 1, at 23.  On the other side of the 
debate, Ronald Dworkin criticizes Justice Scalia as having “seriously misunderstood the 
implications of his general account for constitutional law, and . . . his lectures therefore 
have a schizophrenic character.”  Ronald Dworkin, Comment to SCALIA, supra note 1, 115, 
115.  Later in his comment, Professor Dworkin refers to Justice Scalia’s translation of the 
Eighth Amendment’s meaning as “bizarre.”  Id. at 121.  Justice Scalia further claims that 
“[i]n some sophisticated circles, [textualism] is considered simpleminded – ‘wooden,’ 
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Justice Scalia has adopted a particularly strident tone for those 
who disagree with him: at a recent meeting of the Federalist Society, 
Justice Scalia made a statement to the effect that one would have to 
be an idiot to believe in a “Living Constitution.”4  No clearer example 
of the recess rhetoric into which this important debate can so quickly 
slide is necessary, and there is no better illustration of why scholars 
need to step back from this ad hominem abyss and take a more 
dispassionate view of the interpretative techniques they employ to 
understand the Constitution. 
One way to accomplish this is to look beyond the law to see how 
others tackle similar questions of interpretation.  This perhaps allows 
for a less passionate inquiry into the interpretative process stripped of 
the life-changing outcomes of doctrinal orthodoxy.  Without being so 
concerned about the end result, scholars might be able to make more 
reasoned conclusions about the means used to achieve that result.  
Other than literature, which already has a full body of scholarly work 
devoted to its relationship with the law,5 two promising fields of 
intellectual inquiry for this experiment are religion and music.6  
Religion is, for me at least, disqualified because it brings into play 
numerous moral and ethical issues I would rather avoid here.7  But 
music offers a more neutral and potentially helpful forum for the 
purpose of this article. 
 
‘unimaginative,’ ‘pedestrian,’” SCALIA, supra note 1, at 23, although his failure to cite to 
sources of those descriptions makes verification of them impossible. 
 4. Justice Scalia made this comment at a meeting of the Federalist Society held in 
Puerto Rico in February, 2006.  Associated Press, Scalia Raps ‘Living Constitution,’ CBS 
NEWS, Feb. 14, 2006, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/02/14/supreme 
court/main1315619.shtml.  According to the Associated Press report, Justice Scalia said 
that “[t]he argument of [Constitutional] flexibility . . . goes something like this:  The 
Constitution is over 200 years old and societies change.  It has to change with society, like 
a living organism, or it will become brittle and break. . . . But you would have to be an idiot 
to believe that.”  Id. 
 5. I will not even attempt to summarize the goals of the law and literature 
movement here, nor will I attempt to provide a bibliography of its work;  either attempt 
would swamp this little article.  For those interested in the subject, and who are as yet 
unaware of the many valuable insights provided by the study of law and literature, and the 
many trenchant and well-articulated objections to this way of looking at the law, see, for 
example, INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE: A HERMENEUTIC READER (Sanford 
Levinson & Steven Mailloux, eds., 1988);  RICHARD A. POSNER,  LAW AND LITERATURE: A 
MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION (1988). 
 6. Like the law, both religion and music have texts that must be interpreted  and 
orthodox and reform branches that juxtapose fundamental textualism with liberal 
interpretation. 
 7. For a valuable discussion into the interweaving of religious and legal doctrine, 
see PELIKAN, supra note 1. 
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This is admittedly not new ground.  Timothy Hall has traced 
scholarly comparisons between legal and musical interpretation back 
to the Fourteenth Century.8  In more recent times Jerome Frank,9 
Richard Posner,10 Hall himself,11 and perhaps most significantly, 
Sanford Levinson and J.M. Balkin,12 among others,13 have all written 
about the ways in which musical and legal interpretative practices can 
inform each other.  I tread gratefully in the footsteps of these scholars 
while also trying to branch out in a slightly different direction. 
The goal of this article is a very modest one: to use one piece of 
music, the first movement of Beethoven’s Eroica symphony,14 to 
 
 8. Timothy S. Hall,  The Score as Contract: Private Law and the Historically 
Informed Performance Movement, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 1589, 1589-90 (1999) (citing 
ANONYMOUS,  ARS CANTUS MENSURABILIS MENSURATA PER MODOS IURIS [THE ART OF 
MENSURABLE SONG MEASURED BY THE MODES OF LAW]  (C. Matthew Balensuela ed. & 
trans., 1994)). 
 9. Jerome Frank, Words and Music: Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretation,  
47 COLUM. L. REV. 1259 (1947). 
 10. Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1365 (1990) (book 
review). 
 11. Hall, supra note 8. 
 12. Sanford Levinson & J.M. Balkin, Interpreting Law and Music: Performance 
Notes on “The Banjo Serenader” and “The Lying Crowd of Jews,” 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 1513 
(1999) [hereinafter Levinson & Balkin, Interpreting Law and Music]; Sanford Levinson & 
J.M. Balkin, Law, Music, and Other Performing Arts,  139 U. PA. L. REV. 1597 (1991) 
[hereinafter Levinson & Balkin, Law, Music, and Other Performing Arts].  Not only is 
Levinson and Balkin’s work significant in its recognition that lawyers and musicians (as 
well as textual interpreters in other fields) have much to teach each other, Levinson & 
Balkin, Law, Music, and Other Performing Arts, supra at 1656-58, it also has some points 
of intersection with this article.  Levinson and Balkin consider questions of pitch in musical 
performance, id. at 1619-21, the significance of a seemingly wrong note in a Beethoven 
work, id. at 1598-99 (noting that the work in Levinson and Balkin’s case is the first 
movement of Beethoven’s first piano concerto), and the role of the early music movement, 
id. passim (their article is, at least on the surface, a book review of AUTHENTICITY AND 
EARLY MUSIC (Nicholas Kenyon ed., 1988)).  There are, however, significant differences 
between Levinson and Balkin’s approach and mine.  Levinson and Balkin are more 
interested in the theory of interpretation, the doctrinal underpinnings of the interpretative 
process.  By contrast, I focus here more on the result, the practical effect of those doctrines 
when applied to a text, which I believe makes this article complimentary to Levinson and 
Balkin’s work. 
 13. See Judit Frigyesi, Sacred and Secular – What Can Music Teach Us About 
Jewish Thought, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 1673 (1999); Peter Goodrich, Operatic Hermeneutics: 
Harmony, Euphantasy, and Law in Rossini’s Semiramis,  20 CARDOZO L. REV. 1649 (1999); 
Desmond Manderson, Et Lux Perpetua: Dying Declarations & Mozart’s Requiem, 20 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1621 (1999); Hanne Petersen, Peripheral Perspectives on Musical Orders, 
20 CARDOZO L. REV. 1683 (1999); Penelope Pether, Semiotics; Or Wishin’ and Hopin’?, 20 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1615 (1999). 
 14. I will use the symphony’s familiar name throughout, even though the work is 
more accurately known as Beethoven’s Third Symphony, Opus 55.  The name “Eroica” 
became attached to the symphony after Beethoven erased an original dedication to 
Napoleon Bonaparte from the symphony’s title page and replaced it with the title “Sinfonia 
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consider how legal scholars, using the doctrinal principles they have 
developed to interpret the Constitution, would interpret the piece as 
conductors.15  This article makes no pretense of offering a new genre of 
legal hermeneutics; there is no suggestion here that a “law and 
musicology” movement will provide a comprehensive analytical 
framework which we can use to solve problems of Constitutional 
interpretation.  Rather, this article suggests that musical 
interpretative “doctrines” – if so loose a collection of practices merits 
the term – share some common elements with legal doctrines.  
Further, by viewing the law through the different lens that music 
provides, scholars might gain some new insight into their own 
doctrinal landscape. 
This article focuses most of its attention on Justice Scalia and 
his “textualist” approach to interpretation.  Justice Scalia’s 
relationship with the Constitution is analogous to that of a conductor 
of an orchestral score: he is the principal advocate for a single theory 
of Constitutional interpretation, and he is a Supreme Court Justice 
who has put his interpretative theory into practice.  Both conductor 
and Justice must approach the text with an interpretative theory in 
mind and then apply that theory in a specific context that equates to a 
“performance.”16  In particular, Justice Scalia’s conviction that a 
 
eroica.”  ALEXANDER THAYER,  THAYER’S LIFE OF BEETHOVEN 348-49 (Elliot Forbes ed., 
Princeton Univ. Press 1973) (1921).  The Eroica Symphony is an ideal choice for this 
analysis because it inspires the same sense of awe to many musicians as the Constitution 
does for lawyers and judges.  Written at approximately the same time (Eroica was written 
in 1804, id. at 348, and the Constitution was written in 1787), the Eroica is a work of major 
significance, not just in Beethoven’s output but for all subsequent musicians.  See, e.g.,  
MAYNARD SOLOMON,  BEETHOVEN 250 (2d ed. 1998) (“With [Eroica] we know that we have 
irrevocably crossed a major boundary in Beethoven’s development and in music history as 
well.”).  The length of the first movement alone, see ROBERT SIMPSON, BEETHOVEN 
SYMPHONIES 19 (1970) (noting that it is “one of the longest first movements in existence”), 
marks the work as trail-blazing, and it is the foundation upon which the modern 
symphonic repertoire is built.  Later in life, Beethoven identified the Eroica as his favorite 
symphony (although he had not yet written his ninth symphony).  THAYER, supra at 674. 
 15. I have chosen conducting as the musical metaphor for judicial interpretation 
simply because, in this case, the interpretative decisions in the Eroica would typically be 
made by a conductor.  This is not to say, of course, that conductors are the ultimate 
interpreters.  Nor is it to say that the Eroica must be interpreted by a conductor in order to 
work;  conductorless orchestras such as the Orpheus Chamber Orchestra could doubtless 
perform a compelling interpretation of Eroica if they gave themselves enough time to 
rehearse the piece thoroughly.  The choice of a conductor here is merely a reflection of the 
common practice of performing this particular piece with a conductor. 
 16. Levinson and Balkin’s description of law as a “performing art” is, it seems to 
me, precisely correct.  See Levinson & Balkin, Law, Music, and Other Performing Arts, 
supra note 12. 
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textualist approach to Constitutional interpretation17 is the only 
coherent and legitimate approach to statutory interpretation18 lends 
itself to examination by applying it to interpretation of a document 
from a different field.  The benefits and problems of a textualist 
approach might stand out in clearer relief when projected against a 
musical rather than a legal background. 
I. CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
A fully integrated discussion of the various modes of 
Constitutional interpretation is beyond the scope of this article.  Thus, 
an abbreviated and admittedly simplistic identification of the three 
principal theories of Constitutional interpretation in contemporary 
American jurisprudence will have to suffice.  These three theories 
include Justice Scalia’s “textualist” approach, in which the analyst 
limits interpretation to the ordinary meaning of the words that 
constitute the text,19 the “intentionalist” approach, in which the 
interpreter seeks to discern and apply the text drafter’s original 
intent,20 and the “contextualist” approach, or the interpretative 
practice of allowing the contemporary context in which the text is 
being analyzed to inform the text’s meaning.21 
A. Textualism 
In a sense, the name of this approach is its own description; 
textualism requires a devotion to the text above all other 
considerations.22  Justice Scalia, the most influential of textualists 
 
 17. And not just Constitutional interpretation.  Justice Scalia makes clear that his 
textualism is intended to be an “intelligible theory” that applies to all forms of statutory 
interpretation.  SCALIA, supra note 1, at 14.  Thus, while I will continue to use 
Constitutional interpretation as the benchmark for legal interpretation here, the legal 
doctrines I discuss are as applicable to other legislative enactments as musical doctrines 
are applicable to other music than the Eroica. 
 18. “The text is the law, and it is the text that must be observed.”  Id. at 22. 
 19. “I agree with Justice Holmes’s remark, quoted approvingly by Justice 
Frankfurter in his article on the construction of statutes:  ‘Only a day or two ago – when 
counsel talked of the intention of a legislature, I was indescreet enough to say that I don’t 
care what their intention was.  I only want to know what the words mean.’”  Id. at 22-23 
(citing Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 
527, 538 (1947)). 
 20. See infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text. 
 21. See infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text. 
 22. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 1, at 23 (“To be a textualist in good standing, one 
need not be too dull to perceive the broader social purposes that a statute is designed, or 
could be designed, to serve;  or too hide-bound to realize that new times require new laws.  
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because of his role as Supreme Court Justice, insists that textualism 
not be confused with either what he calls “strict constructionism” or 
with what this article refers to as intentionalism.  Justice Scalia has 
stated: “I am not a strict constructionist, and no one ought to be – 
though better that, I suppose, than a nontextualist.  A text should not 
be construed strictly, and it should not be construed leniently; it 
should be construed reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means.”23 
An unabashedly formalist approach to interpretation,24 
textualism has several distinct features.  It eschews the use of canons 
of construction25 and legislative history.26  Textualism also rejects the 
notion of a “flexible” Constitution27 in favor of restraining 
interpretation to the limited range of meanings associated with the 
words that comprise the text.28  Any interpretation going beyond the 
text’s meaning is impermissible.29 
 B. Intentionalism 
I use this term to mean the familiar strategy wherein the 
interpreter seeks to glean the text’s meaning as imparted by its 
creator or creators.30  Although the text in question might be the 
 
One need only hold the belief that judges have no authority to pursue those broader 
purposes or write those new laws.”) 
 23. Id. 
 24. “Of all the criticisms leveled against textualism, the most mindless is that it is 
‘formalistic.’  The answer to that is, of course it’s formalistic!”  Id. at 25. 
 25. Id. at 25-29. 
 26. Id. at 29-37. 
 27. Id. at 41-47. 
 28. To explain what he means by this, Justice Scalia uses an example from Smith 
v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993).  See id. at 23.  At issue was whether a defendant who 
sought to purchase cocaine in exchange for an unloaded firearm was subject to a 
statutorily-imposed sentence enhancement for “using a firearm during and in relation to a 
drug trafficking crime.”  Id. at 23-24.  Although the majority of the Supreme Court’s 
justices voted that this was “use” within the contemplation of the language under 
consideration, Justice Scalia dissented, arguing that “[t]he phrase ‘uses a gun’ fairly 
connoted use of a gun for what guns are normally used for, that is, a weapon.”  Id. at 24. 
 29. Id. at 24-25. 
 30. Justice Scalia prefers the term “originalist” to describe this method of 
interpretation.  See Scalia, supra note 3, at 851-52 (describing Chief Justice Taft’s approach 
to Constitutional interpretation in Myers v. Unites States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), in which the 
Chief Justice examined not just the text of the Constitution, “but also the contemporaneous 
understanding of the President’s removal power (particularly the understanding of the 
First Congress and of the leading participants in the Constitutional Convention), the 
background understanding of what ‘executive power’ consisted of under the English 
constitution, and the nature of the executive’s removal power under the various state 
constitutions in existence when the federal Constitution was adopted”).  A more recent 
example of Supreme Court intentionalism can be found in Justice Souter’s opinion in Ortiz 
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primary tool used to derive this meaning,31 the intentionalist 
interpreter can (and often does) go outside of the text, usually to look 
at the legislative history surrounding the text’s creation, in order to 
fully understand the text’s original meaning.32 
C. Contextualism 
Contextualism is the term I use to describe the belief that a 
Constitution is a living document, and that its meaning must be 
derived, in part, from the context within which the text is being 
interpreted.  For a contextualist, a text’s meaning is derived from its 
content but is informed by the values of contemporary society.33 
 
v. Fibreboard Corp., in which the Court was asked to construe the meaning of Federal Rule 
of Civil Procdure 23(b)(1)(B) regarding class actions.  527 U.S. 815 (1999).  After 
considering such sources as letters written by members of the 1966 Advisory Committee to 
one another and a law review article written by the Committee reporter in order to 
determine what the Committee “must have assumed would be at least a sufficient set of 
conditions to justify binding absent members of a class under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), from which 
no one has the right to secede,” id. at 838, the Court interpreted the rule from the 
perspective not of the plain meaning of the text, but rather of its perception of the rule’s 
legislative history.  Id. at 841-42 (noting that “[t]he Advisory Committee, and presumably 
the Congress in approving subdivision (b)(1)(B), must have assumed that an action with 
[certain] characteristics would satisfy the limited fund rationale cognizable under that 
subdivision,” even though the term “limited fund” appears nowhere in the language of the 
rule). 
 31. This is not necessarily the case, as Justice Scalia notes.  “A few terms ago, I 
read a brief that began the legal argument with a discussion of legislative history and then 
continued (I am quoting it verbatim):  ‘Unfortunately, the legislative debates are not 
helpful.  Thus, we turn to the other guidepost in this difficult area, statutory language.’”  
SCALIA, supra note 1, at 31. (citing Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co.,  490 U.S. 504, 530 
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 21,  Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. 
Dist. 491 U.S. 701 (1989)). 
 32. Thereby earning Justice Scalia’s disapproval:  “What is most exasperating 
about the use of legislative history . . . is that it does not even make sense for those who 
accept legislative intent as the criterion.  It is much more likely to produce a false or 
contrived legislative intent than a genuine one.”  SCALIA, supra note 1, at 31-32. 
 33. An example used by Justice Scalia to deride this approach works well enough to 
describe it.  Three Supreme Court Justices – Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun – believed 
the death penalty to be in violation of the Eighth Amendment, even though (as Justice 
Scalia believes and, for the purposes of this illustration only, I will accept) the death 
penalty’s use is contemplated by the Constitution.  SCALIA, supra note 1, at 46; see infra 
text accompanying notes 64 & 65.  These Justices reached this conclusion not because a 
prohibition against the death penalty exists in the text of the Constitution, or because 
there appears in the legislative history an indication that the Constitution’s framers 
intended for it to be considered as a “cruel and unusual punishment,” but rather because 
the death penalty had become, in their belief, a cruel and unusual punishment by 1976 
(when Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 227, 
227 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting), id. at 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting)) and 1994 (Callins 
v. Collins,  510 U.S. 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) 
(“Rather than continue to coddle the Court's delusion that the desired level of fairness has 
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Although Justice Scalia believes that one must be an “idiot” to 
believe in a living Constitution,34 distinguished jurists from other 
countries are more sympathetic to the contextualist approach.  Justice 
Aharon Barak, President of the Supreme Court of Israel, has written 
an eloquent defense of the contextualist approach to Constitutional 
interpretation: 
The intent of the constitutional authors, however, exists alongside the 
fundamental views and values of modern society at the time of interpretation.  The 
constitution is intended to solve the problems of the contemporary person, to 
protect his or her freedom.  It must contend with his or her needs.  Therefore, in 
determining the constitution’s purpose through interpretation, one must also take 
into account the values and principles that prevail at the time of interpretation, 
seeking synthesis and harmony between past intention and present principle.35 
In addition, Australian Justice Michael Kirby has neatly summarized 
the contextualist strategy as requiring that “[t]he meaning and 
content of the words take colour from the circumstances in which the 
words must be understood and to which they must be applied.”36 
II. MUSICAL INTERPRETATION 
Interpretative practices in the musical world are similar to 
methods of Constitutional interpretation, although the political labels 
one might attach to proponents of the various schools are reversed.  
The “conservatives” of the musical world are the contextualists, who 
believe that musical interpretation is an evolving issue and that music 
should be interpreted based on contemporary interpretative criteria.37  
By contrast, the “radicals” of the musical world are the textualists who 
believe in devotion to the written note and to reproducing the written 
score as faithfully as possible.38 
 
been achieved and the need for regulation eviscerated, I feel morally and intellectually 
obligated simply to concede that the death penalty experiment has failed. It is virtually 
self-evident to me now that no combination of procedural rules or substantive regulations 
ever can save the death penalty from its inherent constitutional deficiencies.”)). 
 34. See supra note 4. 
 35. Aharon Barak, A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a 
Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 69 (2002). 
 36. The Hon. Michael Kirby, J. of the High Ct. of Austl., Sir Anthony Mason 
Lecture at the Meeting of the University of Melbourne Law Students’ Society: 
Constitutional Interpretation and Original Intent – A Form of Ancestor Worship? (Sept. 9, 
1999), available at http://www.hcourt.gov.au/speeches/kirbyj/kirbyj_ constitu.htm. 
 37. See infra note 39. 
 38. Some have taken the analogy even further, writing of the “fierce Manichean 
struggles of good versus evil,” BERNARD D. SHERMAN,  INSIDE EARLY MUSIC:  
CONVERSATIONS WITH PERFORMERS 4 (1997) (quoting Bernard Holland,  A Streak in the 
Heavens Has Become a Straggler, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1993, at 31), between “mainstream 
musicians” and the “history-minded upstarts.”  Id.  The contest has also been described as 
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A. Musical Contextualism 
Musical contextualists are musicians who interpret music 
without regard to the performance practices or conventions of the time 
in which the music was written39 and instead offer an idiosyncratic 
response to the music.  In essence, musical contextualists40 encourage 
the audience to experience the musician’s personal reaction to the 
musical text.  This is not to say that the musical contextualist’s 
performance is unthinking or anti-intellectual.41  To the contrary, a 
contextualist performance can be the subtly nuanced product of 
intense textual analysis and careful rehearsal designed to clarify the 
musician’s intentions.  But a contextualist performance is, at its heart, 
a performance of the musician’s interpretation of the work, not a strict 
adherence to the soundworld42 that the composer might have had in 
mind when the piece was written. 
 
a “war.”  Id.  And while music is no stranger to “wars” between groups of opposite-minded 
individuals (the most famous, perhaps, being the Guerre, or Querelle, des Bouffons, “[a] 
partisan squabble concerning the respective merits of French and Italian music, in 
particular opera, which was fought out in Paris between 1752 and 1754. . . .”  Arnold 
Whittall,  Bouffons, Querelle des, in 3 THE NEW GROVE DICTIONARY OF MUSIC AND 
MUSICIANS 96, 96 (Stanley Sadie, ed., 1980)), the rhetoric is indicative of the passions that 
can be stirred by the question of interpretative practice.  And while Sherman notes that the 
“turf wars appear to be subsiding,” SHERMAN, supra at 6, he also notes an interview with 
Pinchas Zukerman, the noted violinist, in which he was quoted as saying that historically-
informed performance is “asinine STUFF . . . a complete and absolute farce * * * AWFUL.   
. . . Nobody wants to hear that stuff.  I don’t.”  Id. at 7 (quoting David K. Nelson,  An 
Interview with Pinchas Zuckerman,  FANFARE, Mar./Apr. 1990, at 38). 
 39. Indeed, they often affirmatively reject the fruits of such study: 
How can you recreate the circumstances in which the music was first performed? 
. . . If you bring back those old, out of tune violins, then why not have the 
musicians wear breeches and powdered wigs – why not the audience too?  
Imitating what we imagine the surface details of early performances to have 
been doesn’t bring us inside Mozart’s heart and mind and it trivializes him.  We 
need a revival of the instruments of that period about as much as we need the 
kind of dentistry they practiced. 
Stephen Wigler, Authenticity, Russian-Style, in Mozart’s “Requiem,” in OVERTURE: 
BALTIMORE SYMPHONY ORCHESTRA PROGRAM BOOK 13, 14 (2001) (quoting Yuri 
Temirkanov, Music Director, Baltimore Symphony Orchestra). 
 40. I use this term here to balance my use of contextualism in a legal context.  It is 
not a term that would be familiar to musicians. 
 41. Charles Rosen, in my opinion one of the most intellectual of musicians, 
nonetheless rejects the influence of musicology on performance in the deft phrase 
“musicology is for musicians, what ornithology is to the birds.”  SHERMAN, supra note 38, at 
3 (quoting CHARLES ROSEN, THE FRONTIERS OF MEANING 72 (1995)). 
 42. I use the term “soundworld” here to capture a myriad of technical performance 
details, such as pitch, instrument choice, articulation, and so on, that collectively make up 
the sound of the music. 
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 B. Musical Textualism 
Standing in direct contrast to the contextualist approach is the 
musical textualist approach.43  Under this approach, the composer’s 
soundworld is very much an element of the performance.44  Musical 
textualist performances are characterized by their attention to the 
performing styles and conditions that prevailed at the time that the 
musical text was written.45  Such performances usually use 
instruments of the time or modern recreations of those instruments.46 
Textualist performances are not identical, because musicians 
are almost always instrumentalists first and scholars second,47 and 
they will often disagree as to the meaning of the historical record.48  
While musical textualist performances will differ in detail and sound, 
however, they are united in the attention they pay to the historical 
record and the sound made by instruments of the piece’s composition 
period.49 
 
 43. Although I use this term to draw parallels to what Justice Scalia calls a 
textualist approach in legal interpretation, the two are not mirror images.  In particular, 
while the musical textualist seeks to simulate the composer’s soundworld, it would be the 
rare (and foolhardy) musical textualist who would argue that any performance could 
accurately portray only those interpretative gestures intended by the composer to the 
exclusion of all other influences. 
 44. See infra note 49. 
 45. This approach to musical interpretation was often called the “early-music 
revival,” see SHERMAN, supra note 38, at 3, but this term is no longer valid (if, indeed, it 
ever was) in light of performances of Brahms, see JOHANNES BRAHMS, SYMPHONY NO. 1, 
OP. 68  (Roger Norrington, Conductor, EMI Classics 1991), Wagner, see RICHARD WAGNER, 
ORCHESTRAL WORKS (Roger Norrington, Conductor, EMI Classics 1995), and Verdi, see 
GIUSEPPE VERDI, MESSA DA REQUIEM  (John Eliot Gardiner, Conductor, Phillips 1992) that 
bring contemporary textualist-based performances to the threshold of music written during 
the sound recording era. 
 46. The changes in instrument construction can have a profound effect on the way 
an instrument sounds and on the way an instrumentalist plays the instrument.  For 
example, playing on strings made of gut, as opposed to steel, can have a significant effect 
on how much vibrato the instrumentalist uses.  See SHERMAN, supra note 38, at 207, 210-
11 & n.9 (discussing the changes in string composition and the effect on vibrato). 
 47. “I think the mastering of an instrument never goes through reading first, and 
then playing.  It goes through playing first, and then reading – and having good colleagues, 
especially people who play other instruments.”  Id. at 209 (quoting from an interview with 
Anner Bylsma). 
 48. For example, Anner Bylsma, a cellist who plays on baroque cellos, believes that 
performers should vibrate on dissonances, not consonances.  Id. at 211.  By contrast, 
Julianne Baird, an American soprano specializing in baroque music, believes that 
dissonant notes should not be sung with vibrato.  Id. at 225, 235-36. 
 49. Sherman recalls a musician arguing that musicians are “under an absolute 
injunction to try to find out all that can be known about the performance traditions and the 
sound-world of any piece that can be performed, and to try to duplicate these as faithfully 
as possible.”  Id. at 5 (quoting Donald Vroon, in AM. REC. GUIDE, Mar./Apr. 1993, at 220). 
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 C. Musical Intentionalists 
Located somewhere on the continuum between the polar 
opposites of musical contextualists and textualists are the 
intentionalists.  These are musicians who take the printed score as 
their principal point of departure but who will countenance changes to 
the text to clarify what they believe to be the composer’s intentions.  I 
believe that musical intentionalists make up the majority of 
contemporary performers. 
Perhaps the most concise statement of intentionalist principles 
comes from the conductor Erich Leinsdorf: “1. Great composers knew 
what they wanted.  2. The interpreter must have the means at his 
disposal to grasp the composers’ intentions.  3. Music must be read 
with knowledge and imagination – without necessarily believing every 
note and word that is printed.”50  Intentionalist musicians will 
typically use contemporary instruments, but will be influenced, to 
some degree, by scholarship about performance practice.51 
III. PUTTING THEORY INTO PRACTICE 
Having laid out the principal themes, the focus of this article  
will now shift to examinations of some interpretative problems 
presented by the first movement of the Eroica symphony and how 
Justice Scalia, as a textualist conductor, would employ his doctrinal 
philosophy to solve those problems. 
This is not a simple process; conductors face an almost 
incalculable number of decisions over the course of a movement as 
long as this,52 and any attempt to discuss each of these possible 
decisions would bog this discussion down irretrievably.  Rather than 
attempt this impossible task, this article will consider three principle 
 
 50. ERICH LEINSDORF, THE COMPOSER’S ADVOCATE: A RADICAL ORTHODOXY FOR 
MUSICIANS,  at viii (1981). 
 51. Amongst conductors, Sir Charles Mackerras and Sir Simon Rattle have both 
conducted period-instrument orchestras and have allowed that experience to inform the 
performances they give with contemporary-instrument orchestras.  David Zinman’s 
recordings of Beethoven symphonies seek to recreate Beethoven’s metronome markings 
and sound as if the conductor has studied, and learned from, the phrasing and articulation 
typical of period-instrument orchestra performances. 
 52. In addition to the numerous decisions a conductor must make before the first 
rehearsal – a tiny fraction of which are discussed in this article – the conductor must, at 
rehearsal, tailor an interpretative conception of a work to the capabilities of the orchestra, 
incorporating those interpretative decisions made independently by the musicians that fit 
the conductor’s overall interpretation and rejecting those that do not.  In performance, the 
conductor must be exquisitely attuned to the sound and energy of the performance, 
adjusting previously decided-upon interpretative details if necessary. 
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interpretative elements – pitch, tempo, and textual error – as well as 
the particular problems raised by the Eroica’s first movement coda.  
Although this approach will leave numerous issues untouched, it 
should provide an insight into the way legal interpretative doctrines 
can produce both expected and unexpected results when applied to 
musical performance. 
A. Pitch 
The Eroica symphony is in E♭ major.  It begins with a short 
but arresting introduction of two E♭ major chords, played forte by the 
entire orchestra, before the first subject begins with a piano theme 
played by the cellos that outlines an E♭ major triad:53 
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This is where the first problem arises: before the orchestra 
plays a single note, the conductor has to decide which E♭ the 
orchestra should play.  This may, at first impression, appear to be a 
non-issue.  Instrumentalists have a limited number of ways to play a 
note.  While each way might produce a slightly different timbre and 
therefore might be the subject of discussion during rehearsal, an E♭ 
seems to be an E♭. 
Which E♭ the orchestra should play, however, is a more 
nuanced question than this, and the answer depends on the A to 
which the orchestra has tuned.54  The current standard A was set by 
 
 53. LUDWIG VAN BEETHOVEN, SYMPHONY NO. 3 IN E♭ MAJOR (EROICA), measures 1-
7 (Max Unger ed., Ernst Eulenberg 1936) [hereinafter EROICA]. 
 54. Orchestras tune to an A given by the oboe before each half of a concert, and 
usually between pieces as well.  The convention of using an A to tune presumably has 
something to do with A being a convenient tuning note for all string instruments, the 
majority of instruments in an orchestra.  The oboe gives the pitch (unless the orchestra is 
playing a piano concerto) because it possesses a “high[ ] degree of sheer cutting power” and 
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the International Standards Organization (“ISO”) as 440 Herz (“Hz”) 
in 1955.55  Many contemporary orchestras, however, prefer the 
brighter sound given by an A of 441 Hz or even 442 Hz.56  The 
contextualist would likely be unperturbed by this, and would accept 
whatever A is on offer or, as is the case in some American orchestras, 
is contractually required.57 
But, the intentionalist and textualist would both have to 
consider the pitch problem more carefully.  To accurately predict 
Justice Scalia’s pitch choice, one must look at the original text and try 
to understand what a composer meant by E♭ in 1804 Vienna (the year 
and place in which Eroica was written).58  A collection of tuning forks 
from the early Nineteenth Century provides proof that in 1810 the 
London Philharmonic Society, as well as opera houses in Dresden, 
Berlin, and Paris, were all using an A that was “a significant portion 
of a semitone lower” than the contemporary 440 Hz standard. 59  
Although Vienna seems to have welcomed a brighter, higher sound 
 
because of “a particularly strong fundamental in its harmonic structure, and its vibrant 
expressiveness. . . .”  NORMAN DEL MAR, ANATOMY OF THE ORCHESTRA 169 (1981). 
 55. Mark Lindley, et al., Pitch, in 14 THE NEW GROVE DICTIONARY OF MUSIC AND 
MUSICIANS 779, 785 (1980). 
 56. The Boston Symphony Orchestra, for example, tunes to an A of 441 Hz.  E-mail 
from Lucia Lin, First Violinist, Boston Symphony Orchestra, to Ian Gallacher (July 29, 
2006, 01:54 EST) (on file with author).  By contrast, my home orchestra, the Syracuse 
Symphony Orchestra, tunes to an A of 440 Hz.  Telephone Interview with Richard Decker, 
General Manager, Syracuse Symphony Orchestra (Aug. 2, 2006).  Orchestras can run into 
pitch problems when playing in remote locations.  The pianos at Carnegie Hall, for 
example, were tuned at an A of 442 Hz when the Syracuse Symphony played there in 2003.  
Id.  This required the orchestra to change its tuning patterns to conform to the hall’s 
requirements.  Id.  An extreme example of this pitch variation was experienced at the 2006 
Promenade Concerts in London, where the Steinway piano company was asked to deliver a 
piano tuned at A = 444 Hz for a performance by the Bamberg Symphony Orchestra.  Email 
from Ulrich Gerhartz, Technician, Steinway & Sons, to Ian Gallacher (Nov. 1, 2006, 06:22 
EST) (on file with author). 
 57. The Syracuse Symphony Orchestra’s A = 440, for example, is contractually 
required.  Interview with Richard Decker, supra note 56.  A conductor directing an 
orchestra with a pre-determined A would, of course, have little input into what A the 
orchestra should use.  Any conductor conducting a modern instrument orchestra must 
expect that all works on the program will be played at a pitch centered on A = 440, with 
very narrow variances.  For most conductors working today, a consideration of which pitch 
to use would be unnecessary and superfluous. 
 58. Just as Justice Scalia believes that the Eighth Amendment is “rooted in the 
moral perceptions of the time [in which it was written],” SCALIA, supra note 1, at 145, so 
can we be sure that he would seek to interpret the Eroica symphony with a pitch decision 
rooted in the pitch perceptions of its time. 
 59. Lindley, supra note 55, at 782, 785.  The evidence suggests that A was 
“remarkably close to the ‘present-day pitch . . .’ recorded by Praetorious 200 years earlier.”  
Id. at 785.  Praetorious’s pitch was “about 3/5 of an equal tempered semitone below the 
modern standard a’ = 440. . . .”  Id. at 781-82. 
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than other cities,60 and while this was a period of rapid technological 
change which allowed a brighter tone and a sharper pitch,61 it is likely 
that the Viennese E♭ was still substantially flatter than the note 
recognized as E♭ today.62 
In selecting a pitch for his performance, Justice Scalia would 
likely look to what the text could reasonably be understood to mean, 
rather than what it was intended to mean.  In other words, he would 
look to the “semantic intention” rather than the “original intention.”63  
To clarify this position, Justice Scalia has used as an example the 
meaning of the Eighth Amendment’s “cruel and unusual” language.64  
In that context, he concluded that the words “cruel and unusual” 
abstract “the existing society’s assessment of what is cruel” rather 
than “whatever may be considered cruel from one generation to the 
next.”65  Although this explains his disdain for the contextualist 
approach, the distinction between semantic and original intention is 
less clear.  Also unclear is how a semantic intention can be determined 
without an inquiry, as here, into what may be called the legislative 
history of the meaning of E♭ to 1804 Viennese musical society.66 
 
 60. Id. at 785 (noting that “[t]he flautist A. B. Fürstenau is known to have bought 
his first Viennese flute – presumably built at the higher pitch popular in Vienna – from 
Koch in 1821. . . .”). 
 61. Id. (“The availability of better gut strings for the violin and the concurrent 
alterations to the structure of the instrument . . . accommodated a change in taste 
involving the need for competing instrumentalists and orchestras to produce the ‘larger’ 
sound necessary to fill larger concert halls and opera houses.  In descriptions of high pitch 
levels, disparaging terms like ‘strident’ gave way to appreciative ones such as ‘brilliant’.”). 
 62. The difference in pitch might seem arithmetically small, but the difference in 
sound can be dramatic.  Recordings go in and out of print so rapidly these days that it is 
impossible to state with certainty that a particular recording demonstrating this difference 
will be available, but a relatively recent recording by Roger Norrington offers a 
performance pitched at A = 430 Hz.  LUDWIG VAN BEETHOVEN, SYMPHONY NO. 3, OP. 55 
“EROICA” (Roger Norrington, Conductor, EMI Records 1989). 
 63. SCALIA, supra note 1, at 144.  However, this appears to be a very nice 
distinction between two facially similar propositions. 
 64. Id. at 145. 
 65. Id. 
 66. The symbols on the page of the Eroica have not changed in the intervening 200 
years, just as the words “cruel and unusual” look the same to us as when they were first 
written in the context of the Eighth Amendment in 1791.  Without an understanding of the 
context in which those symbols were written, we might be lured into believing that the 
meaning they convey has not changed either.  Yet as we have seen, a study of pitch reveals 
far greater ambiguity than might at first have been apparent, and the “meaning” of the 
Eroica’s text, at least as to pitch, was far different from that which we might understand 
and hear today.  This “meaning,” however, can only be revealed by a study of the historical 
record.  The difference between the textualist and intentionalist approach appears to be the 
difference between studying the meaning of E♭ to the general Viennese musical community 
of 1804 and the meaning of E♭ to Beethoven specifically.  And while distinguishing 
between “import” (“what the text would reasonably be understood to mean”) and “semantic 
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Either way, we can safely conclude that Justice Scalia would 
conduct Eroica in what Nineteenth Century Vienna would assess E♭ 
major to mean, rather than what E♭ major has come to mean today.  
This result condemns Justice Scalia to having to evaluate the pitch 
information for every piece he conducts, just as he should consider 
every statute as meaning what the words meant when chosen by the 
legislators at the time of drafting.67  This is the only result consistent 
with a textualist philosophy. 
B. Tempo 
Now, the orchestra can play the Eroica’s first E♭ major chord, 
which sounds to contemporary ears like a slightly sharp D major 
chord.  Before the orchestra plays the second chord, the conductor 
must decide at what tempo the movement will be played.  This 
determination is somewhat more complicated than the pitch issue that 
was just resolved.68 
The text itself gives us three clues: 1) the time words “Allegro 
con brio,” 2) the metronomic marking of the dotted half note = 60 
(quarter note = 180), and 3) a theme that has a swinging, one beat to a 
measure feel, with some faster rhythmic figures later in the 
movement:69 
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intention” (“what it was intended to mean”), Justice Scalia acknowledges that “those two 
concepts chase one another back and forth to some extent, since the import of language 
depends upon its context, which includes the occasion for, and hence the evident purpose 
of, its utterance.”  Id. at 144.  The results of an “import” and “semantic intention” analysis 
would, in this case, likely be identical. 
 67. As even this fleeting glimpse into the issue demonstrates, coming to a definitive 
sense of what pitch “means” for a particular piece requires study into not just the year of 
composition, but also the location of composition and the practices then prevalent.  And the 
pitch issue stands as a proxy for a host of additional interpretative decisions a conductor 
must make.  Issues like what types of instruments will generate the pitches (violins, for 
example, have changed radically through the years and pre-Nineteenth Century 
instruments have all been physically altered to accommodate these changes), the balance of 
different instrument groups (how many first violins, second violins, and so on the orchestra 
should contain), and the methods of articulation used by those instruments, just to name a 
few, must be considered and resolved by a conductor seeking to recreate the semantic 
intentions of the original soundworld contemplated by a musical text as faithfully as 
possible. 
 68. It is also, unlike the pitch determination, one that all conductors must make. 
 69. EROICA, supra note 53, measures 65-68. 
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However, each of these clues presents additional problems.  The words 
“allegro con brio” translate as “fast, with energy.”70  This is not the 
most illuminating instruction, and it is one that, like much of the 
Constitution’s text, is open to a substantial amount of interpretation.  
The concept of “fast” is as variable from person to person as the 
concept of how much process is “due,” and “energy” is a term that is 
more helpful in determining expression than tempo.71 
The metronome marking is, on its face, more helpful.  Unlike 
pitch, the number of beats per minute and the means of measuring 
them have not changed since the Nineteenth Century.72  A metronome 
marking appears to give us a scientific designation of tempo.  
However, Beethoven first published the metronome markings to his 
symphonies in 1817,73 thirteen years after Eroica was first performed.  
This makes the metronome markings akin to an amendment of the 
original text. 
In fact, the metronome marking complicates rather than 
simplifies the tempo problem because it designates a very fast tempo, 
leading some to believe that Beethoven could not have intended the 
tempos suggested by the metronome markings that he supplied.74  Yet 
scholars who have studied the issue have concluded that the 
metronome markings for Eroica are consistent with the markings 
Beethoven gave for other music he wrote.75  Scholars have also 
established that Beethoven had a taste for very fast tempos that was 
 
 70. “Practically all the lists of tempo marks in musical dictionaries and handbooks 
give allegro as the standard moderately fast tempo. . . .”  David Fallows, Allegro, in 1 THE 
NEW GROVE DICTIONARY OF MUSIC AND MUSICIANS 268, 268 (1980).  “Brio” is an Italian 
word meaning ‘vivacity,’ ‘energy,’ or ‘fire,’ and “con brio” is “[a] descriptive term for a 
playing style of brilliance and dash.”  David Fallows, Brio, in 3 THE NEW GROVE 
DICTIONARY OF MUSIC AND MUSICIANS 286, 286 (1980). 
 71. At least on a superficial reading.  In fact, however, the notion that the 
movement is to be played “with vigor” might go some way to explaining  the character, and 
therefore the tempo, of the faster moving portions of the movement, discussed infra notes 
74 & 75 and accompanying text, and is therefore useful as a tempo marking after all, as, of 
course, Beethoven intended. 
 72. The modern metronome was patented by Johann Nepomuk Maelzel around 
1815.  E.G. Richardson, Metronome, in 12 THE NEW GROVE DICTIONARY OF MUSIC AND 
MUSICIANS 222, 222-23 (1980). 
 73. Beethoven’s table of metronome markings for the eight symphonies he had 
written to that point (Beethoven wrote the Ninth Symphony in 1824) was published in 
December, 1817.  THAYER, supra note 14, at 687. 
 74. Peter Stadlen rejected many of the fast metronome markings in Beethoven’s 
symphonies as “totally unacceptable.” Clive Brown, Historical Performance, Metronome 
Marks and Tempo in Beethoven’s Symphonies, 19 EARLY MUSIC 247, 249 (1991) (quoting 
Peter Stadlen, Beethoven and the Metronome, 9 SOUNDINGS 38 (1982)) . 
 75. Id. at 258. 
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shared by his contemporaries (and near contemporaries) like 
Schubert, Rossini, Spohr, and Mendelssohn.76 
The internal evidence, suggested by the speed of the written 
notes and orchestra’s actual ability to play them at or close to the 
speed indicated in the movement’s passages, was the most important 
tempo clue for performers in Beethoven’s time.77  And some of Eroica’s 
rapid rhythmic figures can sound rushed to our ears when taken close 
to Beethoven’s designated metronome mark.78  In fact, very few 
performers – even those striving to make their performances as 
historically accurate as possible – actually reach and sustain a tempo 
of quarter note = 180.  An analysis by Eric Grunin of nearly 350 
recorded performances of Eroica shows only one performance, 
conducted by Hermann Scherchen in 1958, as having sustained a 
tempo anywhere close to that metronome mark, at quarter note = 
174.6.79 
For Justice Scalia, however, the internal evidence is likely 
unhelpful: he would reject as irrelevant any insight into the 
composer’s “intent.”80  Just as Beethoven amended his symphony by 
adding the metronome marking later, the framers of the Constitution 
amended their document as well.  Once adopted, those amendments 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 252.  “As well as [the meter and tempo terms], the character of the 
particular piece – its mood, the nature of its themes and especially the types of figuration 
employed in its fastest notes – would have a significant bearing on the tempo. . . .  But 
perhaps the most important additional factor was the proportion of fastest notes within a 
given section.  As Schulz observed:  ‘If a piece in 2/4 is marked Allegro and contains only a 
few or even no [sixteenth notes], then the movement of the meter is faster than when it is 
full of [sixteenth notes];  the case is the same with the slower tempos.’”  Id. 
 78. Two recorded performances in particular come close to Beethoven’s metronome 
marking for this movement:  those conducted by Norrington, BEETHOVEN, supra note 62 
(using historical instruments and A = 430 Hz), and Zinman, LUDWIG VAN BEETHOVEN, 
SYMPHONY NO. 3 IN E FLAT MAJOR OP. 55 “EROICA” (David Zinman, Conductor, Arte Nova 
1998) (using modern instruments and contemporary pitch). 
 79. Eric Grunin, An Eroica Project,  http://www.grunin.com/eroica (last visited Dec. 
15, 2006) (click on the “tempo” tab under Eroica Project in the left column).  Grunin’s study, 
which tracks tempi and repeat observance in 351 performances of Eroica from the 1920s to 
the present-day, suggests that “fast” tempi in Eroica’s first movement have remained 
relatively constant, ultra-slow performances have gone out of fashion today, and that ultra-
fast performances are slowing down as well, having reached a peak in the late 1980s.  See 
id. 
 80. SCALIA, supra note 1, at 38 (“What I look for in the Constitution is precisely 
what I look for in a statute:  the original meaning of the text, not what the original 
draftsmen intended.”). 
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must receive the textualist treatment.81  Justice Scalia’s Eroica would 
presumably be very fast. 
C. Mistakes 
It would be presumptuous to assert that Beethoven made 
“mistakes” in anything he wrote.82  But mistakes could and did occur 
in the copying of original holographic manuscripts.83  These errors can 
become deeply entrenched in a performance tradition once they are 
printed.84  One of a conductor’s principal jobs is finding and correcting 
these mistakes when they occur.85  The Eroica score provides an 
interesting example of a potential misprint. 
 
 81. See id., passim.  As we know, most of the action in Constitutional interpretation 
revolves around the Bill of Rights, and Justice Scalia’s textualist philosophy is grounded in 
an approach to the interpretation of those first ten amendments to the Constitution. 
 82. The same might also be true for other composers considered to be in the “great 
composers” pantheon, like Bach and Mozart, but lesser composers are much less fortunate.  
Perhaps the most famous example is Schumann, a composer whose orchestral music was 
rewritten almost as a matter of course by Nineteenth and Twentieth Century conductors 
on the grounds that his orchestrational skills were weak.  See, e.g.,  HANS GÁL,  SCHUMANN 
ORCHESTRAL MUSIC, 20 (1979) (“One glance at the scores of Schumann’s late years . . . 
reveals a desperate anxiousness to secure every melodic and harmonic detail by extensive 
doubling, the result of which is sometimes an oppressive dullness and sluggishness of 
sound.  Schumann has always been abused for this and his scores have been subjected to 
arbitrary retouchings. . . .”). 
 83. Entire books have been devoted to identifying potential mistakes in scores.  See, 
e.g., NORMAN DEL MAR, ORCHESTRAL VARIATIONS:  CONFUSION AND ERROR IN THE 
ORCHESTRAL REPERTOIRE 22 (1981) (describing some of the common changes made by 
performers of the Eroica symphony to account for possible errors in the original score).  
Perhaps the most confused situation can be found in the works of Rossini, a composer who 
wrote quickly and with a pragmatic eye to copying previously-used material when it suited 
his needs.  Id. at 171.  The circumstances surrounding the state of knowledge as to the 
authenticity of the overture to “The Barber of Seville” are variously described by Del Mar 
as “confused,” “grotesque,”  and an “extraordinary hotch-potch.”  Id. at 171-72. 
 84. Even orchestras with ready access to original source material can fall prey to 
this tendency.  In 1933, Adrian Boult, an English conductor, noticed that the Vienna 
Philharmonic’s string section slurred the first two notes of the second movement of 
Mozart’s G minor symphony, K. 550.  MICHAEL KENNEDY, ADRIAN BOULT 159 (1987).  
Boult suggested that they should check the autograph manuscript, which was upstairs 
from the rehearsal hall.  Id.  When the orchestra players realized that the slur was not in 
Mozart’s manuscript, they removed it from their parts.  Id. 
 85. At least this is one perspective of a conductor’s function.  Others might argue 
that since these mistakes have become entrenched in the soundworld of a piece, they 
should be preserved as if they were the composer’s original intent.  A cynic might argue 
that conductors only change the mistakes they can hear, meaning that most mistakes 
continue to be performed by virtue of incompetence rather than intention.  I choose to take 
the high road here and assume that conductors will identify all potential mistakes and will 
correct those that, upon reflection, appear to be genuine errors rather than textual 
novelties. 
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In measure 494, the double bass has a quarter rest, followed by 
a quarter note E♭, and then a quarter rest.  In contrast, the first 
bassoon plays an E♭ of the same octave on the first beat of the bar:86 
 




       

    
 
 
 
This produces an odd result: a syncopated effect that bears no 
apparent relationship to the musical texture that Beethoven has 
established up to this point.  Most significantly, this measure differs 
in the recapitulation from the parallel measure in the exposition.  In 
the exposition, the comparable bass and bassoon notes are played 
together on the first beat of the measure:87 
 




     
 

 
 
  
 
 
Based on this evidence and on his estimation of the musical 
sense of the piece, conductor and amateur musicologist88 Norman Del 
Mar concludes that the recapitulation bass E♭ “can hardly be 
correct.”89  He then notes that “[t]he whole section both in the 
 
 86. EROICA, supra note 53, measures 493-94. 
 87. Id. measures 90-91. 
 88. As opposed to his son, Jonathan Del Mar, whose critical edition of the 
Beethoven symphonies is the latest word in the practical musicological study of these 
works.  See LUDWIG VAN BEETHOVEN, SYMPHONIES 1-9 (Jonathan Del Mar ed., Bärenreiter 
1996-2000).   I have not used the Del Mar edition in preparing this article because it has 
not yet, I believe, become the standard performing edition of the Eroica symphony.  For 
those interested in hearing the differences wrought by the Del Mar edition, David Zinman’s 
recording of the nine Beethoven symphonies uses it.  Zinman, supra note 78 (“ARTE NOVA 
is the first label to produce all of the Beethoven symphonies based upon the new critical 
Bärenreiter Edition by Jonathan Del Mar on modern instruments, under the baton of a 
world-class conductor.”). 
 89. DEL MAR, supra note 83, at 22. 
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exposition and recapitulation seems to have been scribbled in hastily, 
being the last passages to be composed and inserted into spaces left 
blank for the purpose long after the rest of the movement was 
complete.”90  Unfortunately, Del Mar left no indication as to how he 
reached his conclusions regarding the compositional history of the 
movement: he cites no authority and he was known as a conductor,91 
not a specialist in the arcana of musicology.92 
Accepting Del Mar’s analysis for the purpose of argument, the 
path for the intentionalist and the contextualist conductor seems 
clear.  The printed work fails to represent Beethoven’s original 
intention and appears to be a misprint.  Both the intentionalist and 
the contextualist would rewrite the bass part, putting the double bass’ 
E♭ on the first beat where it arguably belongs. 
The textualist’s position seems equally clear.  A textualist 
would likely ignore the evidence of internal inconsistency from the 
exposition and disregard Del Mar’s subjective and contextualist 
contention that the note “can hardly be correct.”  In short, Justice 
Scalia and other textualists should play the bass E♭ as written in the 
text. 
While Justice Scalia claims to be a textualist and a formalist, 
however, he denies that he is a literalist.93  Therefore, he will accept 
the correction of “scrivener’s errors.”94  Justice Scalia notes that 
“where on the very face of the statute it is clear to the reader that a 
mistake of expression (rather than of legislative wisdom) has been 
 
 90. Id. 
 91. Norman Del Mar was an English conductor, composer and writer on music.  He 
was, at times, principal conductor of the BBC Scottish Orchestra, the Göteborg Symphony 
Orchestra and the Academy of the BBC.  John Warrack, Del Mar, Norman (René), in 5 THE 
NEW GROVE DICTIONARY OF MUSIC AND MUSICIANS 351, 351 (1980). He was the author of 
several books, including an extensive three-volume critical appreciation of Richard Strauss.  
Id. at 352. 
 92. Those seeking a taste of how detailed musicological studies can be can gain a 
glimpse into this world by downloading Jonathan Del Mar’s follow-up report (“nachtrag”) to 
his critical commentary on the Beethoven symphonies.  Jonathan Del Mar, Foreword to 
BEETHOVEN, supra note 88, available at Baerenreiter.com, Download Area, 
https://www.baerenreiter.com/html/download/download_e.htm#bericht (last visited Dec. 14, 
2006) (go to “Critical Reports”; then download “Ludwig von Beethoven, The Nine 
Symphonies—Supplementary Report”).  The discussion of a new source of information 
about the Eroica – orchestral parts found in the Roudice Lobkowicz Collection 
(Nelahozeves Castle, Czech Republic) – includes a lengthy consideration of the significance 
of orange crayon markings, none of which are by Beethoven, to the publication history of 
the symphony.  Id. at 7. 
 93. See SCALIA, supra note 1, at 20-21. 
 94. Id. 
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made[,] . . . it [is] not contrary to sound principles of interpretation . . . 
to give the totality of context precedence over a single word.”95 
This seems a strange position for a textualist to take.96  Either 
the text should be taken at face value or it should not.97  But Justice 
Scalia is willing to go even further by acknowledging that some words 
and phrases in a text should be given “expansive, rather than narrow, 
interpretation[s].”98  For example, he argues that the First 
Amendment’s “freedom of speech” and “freedom of the press” should 
include within them the concept of handwritten notes, even though 
these are neither spoken nor printed words, and the First Amendment 
makes no mention of them.99  The concept of handwritten words, 
apparently, inheres in the limited range of meaning of the word 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. Ronald Dworkin questions Justice Scalia’s position on this point, noting that 
“[a] careless reader might object, however, that any coherent account of statutory 
interpretation must be based on assumptions about someone’s (or some body’s) intention, 
and that Scalia’s own account accepts this at several points.”  Dworkin, supra note 3, at 
115.  He argues later that such pragmatic exceptions to pure textualism “undermine 
Scalia’s position altogether, because they recognize not only the intelligibility but the 
priority of legislative intention, both of which he begins by denying.”  Id. at 116. 
 97. In this context, it is perhaps worth noting that composers sometimes make 
intentional decisions that can seem to others, even those well-attuned to the composer’s 
style, to be mistakes.  In the first movement of Eroica, immediately before the 
recapitulation section begins, Beethoven writes a two measure pianissimo statement of the 
theme, in its correct key, for the second horn.  This two measure statement, coming, as it 
does, before the tonic key of E♭ major has been firmly reestablished for the recapitulation, 
can sound like a mistake in the part by an inattentive horn player.  So, at least, it appeared 
to Ferdinand Ries, who was at the first playing through of the symphony: 
To one unfamiliar with the score this must always sound as if the horn player 
has made a miscount and entered at the wrong place.  At the first rehearsal of 
the symphony, which was horrible, but at which the horn player made his entry 
correctly, I stood beside Beethoven, and, thinking that a blunder had been made 
I said:  ‘Can’t the damned hornist count? – it sounds infamously false!’  I think I 
came pretty close to receiving a box on the ear.  Beethoven did not forgive the 
slip for a long time.   
THAYER, supra note 14, at 350 (quoting FRANZ WEGELER & FERDINAND RIES,  
BIOGRAPHISCHE NOTIZEN ÜBER LUDWIG VAN BEETHOVEN (1845)).  Beethoven had, in fact, 
planned this apparent error carefully and a review of his 1803 sketchbook, which contains 
much of the working-out of the symphony, shows that it had been an integral part of the 
movement since the early stages of its composition.  GUSTAV NOTTEBOHM, TWO 
BEETHOVEN SKETCHBOOKS:  A DESCRIPTION WITH MUSICAL EXTRACTS 72 (Jonathan Katz, 
trans. 1979).  Of course, Justice Scalia the conductor would decline to use the sketches or 
Riese’s comments in making his determination as to whether the seeming “mistake” is or is 
not a scrivener’s error, since both would constitute a form of legislative history. 
 98. SCALIA, supra note 1, at 37-38. 
 99. Id. 
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“speech,” even though the word’s dictionary meanings suggest 
otherwise.100 
This interstitial textualism, where one must look in the gaps 
between definitions to ascertain a word’s complete meaning, seems 
strangely at odds with a textualist philosophy.  This has not gone 
unnoticed by Ronald Dworkin, who argues that a secret 
intentionalism must lie at the heart of Scalian textualism.101  Putting 
aside any qualms, Justice Scalia would change the double bass part at 
measure 494, making it align musically with the bassoon line.  Thus, 
in a rare moment of intellectual alignment, all three interpretative 
doctrines agree that this is the correct result. 
But the strange results are not over.  Justice Scalia’s textualist 
philosophy has other troubling anomalies, exposed by the last 
conducting problem I have picked from the many posed by Eroica’s 
first movement – one of the most celebrated and controversial 
conducting problems in the symphonic canon – the coda. 
D. Coda 
By the time of the first movement coda, every listener to the 
piece is familiar with the triadic principal theme of the movement, 
given again here for comparative purposes:102 
 
 
   
   
 
 
In the coda,103 Beethoven alters the contours of the theme to give it an 
appropriately peroratory effect:104 
 
 100. See id. at 38 (“In this constitutional context, speech and press, the two most 
common forms of communication, stand as a sort of synecdoche for the whole.  That is not 
strict construction, but it is reasonable construction.”).  “Speech” carries its familiar 
meaning of “[t]he action or faculty of speaking;  the ability to express thoughts or feelings 
by articulate sounds, the utterance of words or sentences.”  THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD 
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2975 (4th ed. 1993). 
 101. Dworkin, supra note 3, at 16 (“If judges can appeal to a presumed legislative 
intent to add to the plain meaning of ‘speech’ and ‘press’ . . . why can they not appeal to the 
same legislative intent [in other circumstances]?  Scalia’s answer to this objection must not 
rely on any self-destructive ‘practicality’ claim.  It must rely instead on a distinction 
between kinds of intention, a distinction he does not make explicitly, but that must lie at 
the heart of his theory if the theory is defensible at all.”). 
 102. EROICA, supra note 53, measures 3-6. 
 103. Id. beginning in measure 631. 
 104. Id. measures 631-34.  I have transposed the theme to the bass clef here so the 
differences in the theme can be seen more clearly.  In the symphony, this theme first 
appears at these measures played by a horn in E♭, playing in the treble clef. 
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 
   
 
  
 
 
The new form of the theme is first played piano by the horn, then by 
the first violins, and then again in the lower strings, this time with a 
crescendo.  Next, it is played forte in the winds and, most prominently, 
by the trumpets:105 
 



f
   
       
 
 
       

         
         
           
 
 
The problem is that the trumpets – the loudest of the 
instruments playing this version of the theme – do not actually play 
the entire theme.  Rather, they only play two and two-thirds measures 
of the theme before joining the non-theme-playing instruments in a 
harmonizing ostinato:106 
 
 
   
          
 
The simple reason for this is that the trumpet for which 
Beethoven wrote could not comfortably reach the high B♭ above the 
staff, written as a G, that is necessary to play the new version of the 
theme.107  Faced with this technical problem, Beethoven probably had 
the trumpets play as much of the line as they could and then dropped 
them into the background. 
Contemporary trumpets can play this high B♭ with little 
difficulty.  In 1981, Del Mar noted that, 
[a]lthough in these days of purism and scholarship emendations to Beethoven’s 
text are far less often made than of yore, it is rare indeed to hear a performance in 
which the trumpets play as printed . . . and it is . . . customary for the trumpets to 
 
 105. Id. measures 655-58. 
 106. Id.  The example here is given in transposed form.  In the score, the E♭ trumpet 
line is written in C. 
 107. DEL MAR, supra note 83, at 22 (“[T]he upper G on the large E♭ trumpet – now 
extinct for all intents and purposes – [was] considered too high and perilous for orchestral 
use. . . .”) 
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bring fulfillment to the climax by playing the whole statement of the great theme 
in their turn.108 
This change to the high B♭ transforms the trumpet line109 and 
the entire texture of the sound at this point in the coda: 
 
 
   
 
  
 
 
It is true that Del Mar was a brass player before he was a 
conductor,110 so perhaps his opinion on this issue is not too surprising.  
But other conductors, at least conductors from the previous 
generation, agree with Del Mar.111  The tradition of rewriting the 
trumpet part started over 100 years ago with Bülow112 and is affirmed 
by such authorities as Weingartner113 and Markevich,114 who said that 
this alteration “is without doubt well-founded.”115  These are classic 
 
 108. Id. 
 109. EROICA, supra note 53, measures 655-58, as rewritten. 
 110. Del Mar studied the horn and composition at the Royal College of Music.  
Warrack, supra note 91, at 351.  The book that became “Orchestral Variations” had its 
genesis in Del Mar’s time as a brass player:  “Already, while still a horn player, I had 
begun noting down . . . textual enigmas that arose during rehearsals.”  DEL MAR, supra 
note 83, at ix. 
 111. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 112. See FELIX WEINGARTNER, WEINGARTNER ON MUSIC AND CONDUCTING 101 
(Jessie Crosland trans., Dover Publications 1969) (1907) (“Bülow here allowed the theme to 
be played throughout by the trumpets. . . .”).  Hans von Bülow was a German conductor 
and pianist of the Nineteenth Century.  John Warrack, Bülow, Hans (Guido) Freiherr von, 
in 3 THE NEW GROVE DICTIONARY OF MUSIC AND MUSICIANS 451, 451 (1980).  He studied 
with Wagner and Liszt and married Liszt’s daughter Cosima in 1857, although Cosima left 
him in 1869 in order to marry Wagner.  Id. at 451-52.  As a pianist, he gave the first 
American performance of Tschaikovsky’s First Piano Concerto, and as a conductor, he 
conducted the first performances of Wagner’s Tristan und Isolde  and Die Meistersinger.  
Id. at 452. 
 113. WEINGARTNER, supra note 112, at 101 (“The indistinct character of the theme 
when played without this correction quite justifies us in adopting it.”).  Felix Weingartner 
was an Austrian conductor who succeeded Mahler as principal conductor of the Vienna 
Court Opera and “is remembered [today] as one of the most eminent classical conductors of 
his day, outstanding for the clarity and economy of his beat, for the lack of exaggeration in 
his interpretations, [and] for the precision without rigidity of his tempos.”  Ronald 
Crichton,  Weingartner, (Paul) Felix, in 20 THE NEW GROVE DICTIONARY OF MUSIC AND 
MUSICIANS 315, 315-16 (1980). 
 114. Igor Markevich was an Italian conductor whose parents moved from Russia to 
Switzerland in 1914, when he was two years old.  Noël Goodwin, Markevich, Igor, in 11 
THE NEW GROVE DICTIONARY OF MUSIC AND MUSICIANS, 691 (1980).  His performances 
combined “a volatile personality with meticulous attention to the composer’s instructions, 
and . . . [were] never weakened by sentimental indulgence of expression.”  Id. 
 115. IGOR MARKEVICH,  DIE SINFONIEN VON LUDWIG VAN BEETHOVEN:  
HISTORISCHE, ANALYTISCHE UND PRACTISCHE STUDIEN 208 (1983) (“Daβ dies 
wohlbegründet ist, dürfte auβer Zweifel stehen.”) (translation by the author).  Tastes 
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espousals of the contextualist’s “living document” rationale: what once 
was impossible is now possible, and since it is better this way we 
should do it.116  It is possible to justify the rewrite on intentionalist 
grounds as well: Beethoven probably intended the line to go up, as 
suggested by the rest of the orchestration.  The only thing preventing 
Beethoven from including the trumpet line with the other instruments 
playing the melody appears to have been the technical limitation 
placed on him by the trumpet’s design.  Under this rationale, 
contemporary technology allows conductors and performers to restore 
Beethoven’s original intent, making the altered version more 
“original,” in a way, than what Beethoven actually wrote.  Even 
Toscanini, who claimed to be devoted to the purity of the written text 
over any notions of personal interpretative preference, made this 
change.117 
This presents an interesting problem for the doctrinal 
textualist like Justice Scalia.  The written text itself is clear and 
unambiguous.  The trumpet line literally goes down, not up.  But 
Justice Scalia, as we have seen, is not a literalist – he will bend a little 
if a word or a phrase can be fairly interpreted as including a non-
articulated meaning.118  Just as “speech” can, in his view, encompass 
handwritten words,119 the Eroica theme can be interpreted to 
encompass a note that only technology prevented Beethoven from 
writing.  The First Amendment can be extended to encompass 
 
change relatively quickly.  Although it might have been rare to hear the trumpet line in 
these measures played as written when Del Mar was writing in 1981, the opposite is, I 
think, true today. 
 116. Although not speaking specifically about the trumpet line in the Eroica coda, 
Otto Klemperer, one of the most distinguished conductors of the Twentieth Century, gave 
this defense of “retouching” the orchestration in Beethoven symphonies: 
I don’t do as much as Mahler did, and then only where I find it absolutely 
necessary.  But in some passages it is; if only because, for instance, there were in 
Beethoven’s day no valves in horns and trumpets.  Everything had to be played 
on natural brass instruments which must have sounded terrible.  Then again, 
where there is a melody or a melodic theme in the first violins which I want to 
bring out, I also give it to the second violins, and the second violin parts I give to 
some of the violas, so that it is still there.  . . .  [I]n the funeral march of the 
Eroica, I begin with eight violins and use all sixteen only later. 
CONVERSATIONS WITH KLEMPERER 35 (Peter Heyworth ed., 1973). 
 117. As demonstrated by his famous 1939 recording of the Eroica.  LUDWIG VAN 
BEETHOVEN, SYMPHONY NO. 3, OP. 55 “EROICA” (Arturo Toscanini, Conductor, RCA Victor 
Gold Seal 1992) (1939). 
 118. See supra text accompanying notes 93 & 94. 
 119. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
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technologies that did not exist in the 1790s.120  Perhaps this is no 
different. 
Or perhaps this goes too far.  Perhaps this is merely a 
justification for evolutionary interpretation, something a textualist 
like Justice Scalia cannot permit.  The tradition of rewriting the 
trumpet line is well established, and Justice Scalia is willing to accept 
another “pragmatic exception” to his core textualist principles to allow 
for stare decisis.121  While there is no direct doctrinal musical 
equivalent to the stare decisis doctrine, it does not seem too far a 
stretch to see Justice Scalia the conductor, perhaps grudgingly, 
accepting this rewrite as something that is well-founded “beyond 
doubt.”122  This assumes, of course, that he has made a pitch decision 
that allows for the inclusion of trumpets of sufficiently recent vintage 
to allow them to play the high B♭. 
What we are left with is the strange and slightly unsettling 
image of Justice Scalia, the radical conductor, thumbing his nose at 
the conservative musical establishment by leading a rendition of 
Eroica that is faster and flatter than we are used to hearing and is 
likely performed with period instruments and orchestral proportions, 
much like the performances recorded by Roger Norrington or John 
Elliot Gardiner.123  This leads to a rendition with some puzzling 
textual deviations that are arguably more rooted in an intentionalist 
or even contextualist approach than a textualist should be willing to 
accept, much like the performances recorded by, for example, 
Furtwängler124 or Karajan.125  How Justice Scalia would respond to 
such a performance, were he to hear it, is an interesting question to 
ponder. 
 
 120. See SCALIA, supra note 1, at 45 (describing the Supreme Court’s application of 
the First Amendment’s “freedom of speech” guarantee “to new technologies that did not 
exist when the guarantee was created – to sound trucks, or to government-licensed over-
the-air television” by following “the trajectory of the First Amendment, so to speak, to 
determine what it requires . . .”). 
 121. Id. at 140. 
 122. See supra text accompanying note 115 and discussion pp. 323-26. 
 123. BEETHOVEN, supra note 62;  LUDWIG VAN BEETHOVEN, SYMPHONY NO. 3, OP. 55 
“EROICA” (John Eliot Gardiner, Conductor, Deutsche Grammophon 1994). 
 124. See, e.g., LUDWIG VAN BEETHOVEN, SYMPHONY NO. 3, OP. 55 “EROICA” (Wilhelm 
Furtwängler, Conductor, EMI Classics 2000) (1953). 
 125. LUDWIG VAN BEETHOVEN, SYMPHONY NO. 3, OP. 55 “EROICA” (Herbert von 
Karajan, Conductor, Deutsche Grammophon 2003) (1962). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
What do we, as lawyers, learn from this brief excursion into a 
parallel interpretative universe?  Perhaps we learn nothing more than 
the comforting knowledge that we are not alone. Other disciplines 
have interpretative problems with which they wrestle, and at least 
musicians have devised some strategies for resolving those problems 
that map directly onto the strategies lawyers and judges have 
adopted.  A problem shared is, if nothing else, a problem shared. 
Perhaps, though, looking at musical interpretation might allow 
a discussion about the appropriateness of different approaches to 
textual interpretation without a polarizing debate about social issues 
affected by these approaches’ applications to Constitutional 
decisions.126  Being able to talk about the pitfalls and benefits of 
textualism, contextualism, and intentionalism without having to 
consider abortion, school prayer, or any of the other current 
controversies could be both constructive and refreshing. 
We have only scratched the surface.  This article, as with most 
others dealing with the issue, focused on performance practice: the 
decisions a performer makes when deciding how to play a piece of 
music such as which E♭ we should play when we see a note occupying 
the place on the stave we associate with E♭.  But there are more 
profound inquiries to be made.  For example, we can try to decipher 
what that E♭ means and how we can discern the deeper meaning of 
text through close analysis, and we can look at whether that inquiry 
can tell us anything about deciphering deeper meaning in texts than 
merely looking to what the words mean.127  These inquiries will, I 
hope, be the subject of subsequent work. 
Looking at the rise of the historically informed performance 
practice movement in music128 also raises the intriguing image of a 
created culture and the invention of an interpretative strategy that 
owes little, if anything, to the organic development of performance 
 
 126. This is not even remotely to suggest that I do not think these musical decisions 
are important, or that they “matter” less than Constitutional decisions. 
 127. That is, of course, the premise behind the law and literature movement as well.  
As noted supra note 5, whether or not this movement has fully realized the promise of its 
approach is beyond my scope here. 
 128. For a brief introduction to the rise of the historically informed performance 
practice movement, and the clashes it generated with the more “contextualist” musical 
performance mainstream, see generally SHERMAN, supra note 38;  Howard Mayer Brown,  
Pedantry or Liberation?  A Sketch of the Historical Performance Movement, in 
AUTHENTICITY AND EARLY MUSIC: A SYMPOSIUM 27 (Nicholas Kenyon ed., 1988). 
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practice, a strangely ahistorical process.129  Whether such an inquiry 
can shed insights into the development and intellectual validity of 
Justice Scalia’s neo-textualism is also a matter for further study. 
 
 
 129. Levinson and Balkin touch on this aspect of the early music movement.  
Levinson & Balkin, Law, Music, and Other Performing Arts, supra note 12, at 1627-33. 
